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The purpose of this paper is not to criticize
but rather to supplement Imaoka's "Japanese
Management in Malaysia," which focuses
upon the process of "localization." The
research in Malaysia constitutes only a small
part of a larger comparative study dealing
with the same problem area in the ASEAN
countries, Hongkong, Taiwan and Korea.
The present author participated in the
program, helping Imaoka carry out the
questionnaire survey made in Malaysia in
the summer of 1982, when he and I had the
opportunity to visit Japanese joint ventures
to observe factories, to talk with Japanese
and local managerial staff, and obtain first-
hand information. The present comments
are made on the basis of my personal experi-
ences, data collected, and an analysis of
the survey results.
The Local Situation
Malaysia, a new nation which attained
independence from Great Britain in 1957,
is rich in natural resources and politically
stable, and is regarded as one of the most
successful nations in the region in the field
of economic development. Particularly since
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the racial violence of 1969, the "May 13th
incident," the country has endeavoured to
further development and integration under
the strong leadership of the Malays, at the
same time placing emphasis on Malay
cultural traditions and Islam. From the
beginning, political leaders were acutely aware
of the importance of the private sector and
multinational corporations for capital ac-
cumulation and technology transfer, which
they recognized as being indispensable for
the attainment of their national goals.
Accordingly, they tried to create stable
political and social conditions and a hospit-
able climate for foreign business enterprises.
The late 1960s witnessed, for example, the
enactment of the Investment Incentives Act
(1968), and other tax incentives which,
together with the creation of Free Trade
Zones (1973), encouraged foreign industrial
enterprises and other businesses to open
branches in Malaysia. The Federal Indus-
trial Development Authority, a government
agency, was established with offices in New
York, San Francisco, London, Dusseldorf,
and Tokyo to invite foreign capital into the
Malaysian industrial sector.
The Malaysian economy has, on the
whole, been developing steadily. The stage
corresponding to the Second Malaysian
Plan was reached in the early 1970s, the
Third Malaysian Plan in the late 1970s, and
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now the Fourth Malaysian Plan is in progress.
The economy faces difficult problems,
however, which were aggravated by the
general recession of the world economy.
An economic report issued by the Ministry
of Finance in October, 1982, attributed the
economic difficulties of Malaysia to the low
volume of exports to the OEeD countries,
and especially to declines in the export of
oil (down 13 % from the previous year) and
rubber (down 10.5 %). As a result, the
growth rate of the GNP in 1982 was 6.9%, or
0.7 points lower than the initial prediction.
The long-run picture of the Malaysian
economy in terms of the export of manu-
factured products is, however, more rosy;
while the value of exports between 1970 and
1981 increased almost fivefold, their com-
position changed drastically during those
10 years.
In 1970, the share of rubber in the total
export value was 33 %, and that of tin 20 %,
together they accounted for 53 % of the total
value of Malaysian exports. By 1981, how-
ever, the share of manufactured products
(which was only 4 % in 1970), had increased
to 24 %, while that of rubber and tin had
decreased to 16 % and 8 %, respectively. At
the same time, to the country's good fortune,
the share of oil in the total export value had
risen to 24% in 1981 (compared with 4% in
1970), due mainly to the sharp rise of oil
prices in the early 1970s. The share-increase
of industrialized products in the total value of
Malaysian exports was the result of the
determination of the government to industri-
alize the country with the active participation
of foreign capital, including Japanese joint
ventures.
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Generally speaking, Malaysian attitudes
toward Japan are relatively favorable, and
this is reflected in the "Look-East-Policy"
originally initiated by Dr. Mahatir, the
prime minister. He seems eager to learn
the secret of Japanese economic success,
particularly the conditions underlying the high
morale of Japanese workers and the excellent
rapport between labor and management.
The present M-M (Mahatir-Musa) regime of
Malaysia proposed plans to train Malaysian
industrial workers in Japan, soliciting as-
sistance and cooperation from both the
Japanese government and business circles.
This was prompted by the shortage of skilled
workers and managers in the industrial
sector and the lack of adequate training
institutions. This is undoubtedly a major
area where problems of technology transfer
are inevitable, but at the same time where
Japanese joint ventures have much to con-
tribute.
Japanese Joint Ventures
On average, the Japanese joint ventures in
our sample began operating in Malaysia
in 1971. This was earlier than in other
ASEAN countries except Thailand. Of the
top managers of these companies who
responded to our questions, 87 % stated that
they try to adapt their management style to the
local situations. Nevertheless, the Japanese
principles of management such as groupism,
human relations, mensualization, welfare
benefits within the company, communication
from the bottom up, on-the-job training, etc.,
have firmly become part of everyday practice
in Japanese joint ventures in Malaysia.
In our sample companies, most middle
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managers were recruited locally: 92 % of
the supervisors, 70 % of the administrators,
and 68 % of the personnel managers. These
local middle managers, whose average age
is 36.5, and whose average working period in
their respective companies is 7.1 years, showed
a strong commitment to their companies.
For example, 73 % of them responded that
they are ready to substitute for sick colleagues
without receiving additional pay.
A special issue in employment in Malaysia
is closely related to the government policy
of Bumiputra Priority. This policy was
introduced to deal with the problems and
lower the tensions of this multiracial society.
The tensions were largely a result of British
colonial administration, which subordinated
the Malays, mostly poor farmers in kampongs,
to the Chinese, who were city-dwellers with
economic power. The Malays' inferior
socioeconomic status underwent a drastic
change after the "May 13th incident" in 1969
as the New Economic Policy was forcefully
carried out under the Constitution. In the
economic sphere, it was decided to increase
the Malays' share of employment in sectors
of high productivity and capital accumulation
in order to narrow the income gap among
the different ethnic groups. By 1990, the
economic plan calls for the share of workers
in the secondary industry to be 50 % Malay
and 50 % non-Malay, and the share of the
capital to be 30% Malay, 40% non-Malay,
and 30% foreign. Accordingly, joint ventures
of foreign origin in Malaysia are compelled
to employ a designated ratio of Malay
workers. This may lead to problems when
"talents" are unevenly distributed among the
different ethnic groups. Fortunately, how-
ever, our sample shows a highly desirable
picture in this respect. Whereas the ethnic
breakdown of workers in Malaysian manu-
facturing industry as a whole is 36 % Malay,
56 % Chinese, and 7 % Indian, that in our
sample companies was 63 % Malay, 19%
Chinese, and 14 % Indian.
Local Adaptations of the Japanese Style of
Management
The Japanese style of management is
often said to have contributed much to the
miracle of economic growth in Japan after
World War II. In this context there are two
opposing hypotheses about Japanese manage-
ment. One involves "specific culturalism"
which emphasizes unique social and cultural
traits in the Japanese style of management.
The other denies such uniqueness and con-
tends that Japanese principles of manage-
ment are universal and, therefore, applicable
elsewhere.
The opposition between these two hy-
potheses, "specific culturalism" and "universal
rationalism," however, is not as stark as it
might first appear. Although it is natural
to expect that the Japanese style of manage-
ment with its emphasis on the group might
be more acceptable in Asia, where some of
the basic Japanese values of collectivity are
shared, than in Europe and America, where
modern individualism is firmly established,
it is also true that business behavior, the
behavior of a "living system," should be a
rational adaptation to the environment, at
the least, for survival's sake. The factors
which can be regarded as independent
variables determining business behavior,
regardless of whether a business is foreign
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or local, can be separated into three groups.
The first group is found in the nearest envi-
ronment to the enterprise concerned, and con-
sists of scale, capital share ratio (in the case
of capital of foreign origin), the kind of
industry (or major products), market share
ratio, and so forth. These factors may
be called "management-industry variables."
The second group consists of such variables
as the general economic trend or climate
at a given point in time, and the government's
economic policy, which are beyond the control
of any single corporation. These factors
may be called "politico-economic variables."
Thirdly, there are the "socio-cultural vari-
ables," which include various conditions in
the national and international societies in
which the business concerned is located, and
such cultural and symbolic idea systems as
those of religious beliefs and traditional
values. These stipulates the normative pat-
tern of human relations or groupings, and are
completely given to business corporations.
The present survey research is not aimed
at clarifying systematically the pattern of
management and labour relations of Japanese
joint ventures in Malaysia in terms of these
three groups of variables. But one of the
merits of distinguishing these categories is
that we can employ a much more compre-
hensive explanatory framework, for example,
to understand job-hopping, a troublesome
phenomenon widely observed in Southeast
Asia, instead of simply attributing it to a lack
of commitment or loyalty on the part of
local workers. Other conditions being equal,
we can reasonably anticipate that the fewer
the job opportunities, the less common will
be job-hopping, and that the stronger the
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commitment of workers to other institutions
such as family and neighbourhood com-
munity, the weaker their loyalty to the
company where they work just to make a
living.
It may be argued that the kind of wage-
scale system, promotion system, general
management strategy, and the method of
decision-making a particular joint-venture
employs are, primarily and directly, de-
termined by the first group of variables:
a larger capital share ratio (in the case of
capital of foreign origin) can be interpreted
as meaning a larger "say;" and a monopolistic
market situation may permit companies to
employ a softer system of wage, promotion,
fringe-benefits, and decision-making than a
competitive situation. Also large companies
with relatively abundant capital can afford to
pay more attention to the workers' benefits
and welfare than smaller companies with
poorer finances. In the second and third
categories of variables, business rationality
has to take cultural factors into consideration.
It is necessary to recognize that to install a
small "mosque" for factory workers next
to the workplace (to allow Muslims to
pray in the traditional manner) is not neces-
sarily to give up rationality. It is a perfect
example of adaptation to local conditions.
A company sufficiently sensitive to the
welfare of its workers (and sufficiently
wealthy) would install a "mosque" in Malaysia
and provide a tennis court in other countries.
Concerning the historical background of
the country, it is appropriate here to mention
briefly industrial relations in Malaysia.
Among our sample companies, 47 % of them
(23 companies out of 49) responded that
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they have trade unions. These were mainly
industry-wide unions (as high as 82 %),
although in exceptional cases there were
other types, enterprise unions and craft
unions. This pattern can also be observed in
Singapore, but contrasts clearly with that in
the Philippines and Thailand, where enter-
prise unions are more common. Needless
to say, the present pattern of industrial
relations in Malaysia and Singapore is a
historical product of the British colonial
administration, where labor unions were
organized along industrial lines and labor-
capital negotiations took place at the national
and central level between representatives of
workers and employers.
Historically, Malaysia and Singapore
(which were politically united from 1963 to
1965 as the Federation of Malaysia, before
Singapore seceded as an independent state)
were under British colonial rule; and during
a long succession of independence movements
a British tradition of labor movements and
socialism became established in the region.
Lee Kuan Yew, the present prime minister
of Singapore, for example, having read
jurisprudence in Lincoln's Inn, Cambridge
University, began his career as a consultant
lawyer to labor unions in the peninsula and
in 1954 organized a democratic socialist
party called PAP (People's Action Party).
Currently, Malaysian politics is run by the
Alliance (Barisan Nasional), whose three
main pillars are, UMNO (United Malay
National Organization), MCA (Malaysian
Chinese Association), and MIC (Malaysian
Indian Congress). There is also a viable
opposition party, DAP (Democratic Action
Party), which derived from the PAP in
Singapore. The principal supporters of DAP
are mainly of Chinese origin, which reflects
the historical fact that the main activists of
labor movements in this area were never
Malays who were engaged in rice-cultivation
in insulated kampongs, but Chinese and
Indians. The former were brought into this
British colony to work the tin mines, and
the latter to work the rubber plantations.
As a result, the ideologically socialistic
labor movements could not help but retain a
certain element of anti-Malay sentiment.
Even today, the DAP, representing the
local Chinese, seems to resist the Malays
who, in the citadel of power, propound the
Malay Priority policies. As the British
transferred political power to the local
government rather effectively, socialist and
labor movements have been successfully
incorporated as part of the established social
institutions. The Malaysian Trade Union
Congress was organized on a nationwide
level with different industry-wide unions as
its members. This is why, in Malaysia, the
enterprise unions widely observed in the
Philippines and Thailand (as well as Japan)
have not developed.
The analysis of the answers to our question
asking what policy the top Japanese managers
of our sample companies consciously adopt in
order to promote the Japanese style of
management reveals the following: the three
most frequently adopted policies are,
in order, (1) employment stabilization,
(2) emphasis on management philosophy
and objectives, and (3) emphasis on smooth
human relations. Although the order of
priority may differ from country to country,
these three policies are universally adopted
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by the top Japanese managers of Japa-
nese joint ventures in Southeast Asia.
These managers have also been trying to
localize some of the typical Japanese organi-
zational practices such as on-the-job training,
seniority-based wages, internal promotion,
and smooth human relations between workers
and managers. QC circles had been intro-
duced by 61 % of the sample companies, the
percentage being highest among the sample
ASEAN countries.
As the traditional Asian value of mensua-
lization is, in some form or other, shared
in this region, it is understandable that
many local managers are favorable to their
company's policy of "equalizing" managers
and workers. As a result, 80.5 % of the
local managers in our sample companies
answered that they like to participate in
games or club activities with general workers:
94.0 %of them said that they like to participate
in an annual dinner party sponsored by the
company or a recreational committee: and
78.2 % answered that they have lunch with
workers at the company canteen.
These local middle managers, however, are
not committed to their company for reasons
of "humane sentiment." The reasons they
cited as most important for choosing their
present company were (1) better prospect of
advancement, (2) more chance of learning
new technology, and (3) stable employment,
in that order. Closely related to this rational
choice is the way they came to know of their
present company. Not many learnt of their
present company through friends or relatives
who were somehow connected with it.
Almost 40 % of them said that they came to
know the present company through a news-
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paper advertisement. This figure seems to
be higher than we expected, believing that
networks of relatives and close friends are
still very strong in this society. Perhaps this
is part of a local (social) climate in which
rational and universalistic organizational
practices become accepted and established
regardless of whether they are introduced
by foreign business corporations or local
entrepreneurs.
Concluding Remarks
Since early this century, Japanese have
been economically involved in the Malay
Peninsula to an appreciable extent, both
in scale and commitment, running rubber
plantations and exploiting iron ore. Japan
also occupied this area under the pre-
sumptuous cause of the Great East-Asian
Co-prosperity Sphere. By March 1982, Japan
had reemerged as the largest investor in
this nation (681 million dollars US), and this
is paralleled by an ever-growing presence
of Japanese joint ventures or subsidiaries.
The main incentive for coming to Malaysia
(as well as to other developing countries) is
undoubtedly that they can obtain cheap labor
of good quality (endurance, good sight,
manual dexterity, and so forth), though other
considerations like access to certain natural
resources or to the nearby market are also
involved.
Needless to say, when it comes to helping
developing countries in their own efforts to
help themselves, Japanese assistance should
emphasize technology transfer and manpower
training. So far, in this respect, Japanese
joint ventures have done well in Malaysia,
putting into practice such policies as on-the-
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job training and sending trainees to Japan,
and these programs are highly evaluated by
the local managers. The subject-matter of
this report has to be explored and analyzed
further by specialists and this commentary
only claims to be a stepping stone for such
future studies.
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